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Abstract 
The article uses the private-facts lawsuit of the retired wrestler Hulk Hogan against Gawker 
Media as a case study to look at the challenges of balancing the media’s freedom of 
expression and individuals’ privacy in the contemporary celebrity-centred culture. It suggests 
that the verdict in the privacy suit reflects the jurors’ profound disenchantment with the way 
in which freedom of expression was subverted in this case by the media organisation. It 
further adopts a comparative perspective that draws parallels and highlights differences 
between American and English privacy law. It explores Hogan’s claim through the lens of the 
emerging English privacy jurisprudence and identifies important lessons to be learnt for the 
future of the newly developed tort of misuse of private information.  
Keywords: privacy, celebrities, public interest, exemplary damages 
Introduction 
We live in a media-saturated, celebrity-centred world, where ‘media personalities’ like Kim 
Kardashian can easily ‘break the Internet’ (as the caption of her 2014 Paper magazine cover 
photo stated) by doing nothing more than showing their bare behind or uploading a new 
‘selfie.’1 Due to the high level of media penetration in our everyday lives, it is no longer as 
easy for contemporary celebrities to control their image as it was in the past. As a result, 
these few individuals often find themselves exposed to the ever-watching, voyeuristic gaze of 
the many - what Mathiesen calls ‘synopticism.’2 The public seems to be fascinated by the 
ordinary/extraordinary paradox,3 constantly trying to discover the flawed ‘reality’ behind the 
ostensibly perfect lives of stars, be it body imperfections, drug addiction, adultery, sex 
parties, shoplifting or other ‘ordinary’ problems. Such problems offer an interesting mixture 
of ‘high lives’ and ‘low lives,’ and often feature in news stories produced for the mass 
consumption of unexceptional ‘mid-lives.’4 Responding to the demands of the market and in 
order to give the public what it wants,5 media professionals dedicate more and more time and 
space to such stories and consider them very newsworthy. This has led to a shift of media 
focus from information to entertainment (or ‘infotainment’) and an overall trivialisation of 
media content through a process of ‘tabloidisation.’6 This tabloidisation raises questions as to 
whether the media’s access to celebrities’ lives is without limits and ultimately as to whether 
information that is in the public interest to know is the same as what interests the public in a 
voyeuristic sense. The study of Hulk Hogan’s case against Gawker Media suggests that the 
answer to both these questions should be negative.  
The retired professional wrestler Terry Bollea – better known by his ring name Hulk Hogan – 
successfully sued Gawker Media after it disclosed a 101-second video which featured Hogan 
engaging in sexual activity with a female companion. The ten-day trial in Pinellas County 
Circuit Court, which resulted in the award of damages of US$140 million (£97.3m), was 
followed closely by free speech experts and privacy advocates. It also attracted significant 
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media attention around the world. Gawker is an American-based news website known for its 
aggressive celebrity journalism. Its chequered 12-year-old digital history is interwoven with 
scoops of questionable public interest; from Tom Cruise’s infamous Scientology recruitment 
video to the footage of the former Toronto mayor Rob Ford smoking crack and the post about 
a married Condé Nast executive attempting to hire a gay porn star for sex. The outcome in 
Hogan’s case was unusual not only because claimants in public disclosure cases rarely win 
such suits,7 but also because Hogan won with an atypical and sizeable margin of victory.  
The basis of Hogan’s claim was the private-facts tort, which concerns the publication of true, 
yet highly offensive and embarrassing, private information that is ‘not newsworthy.’8 There 
is a very important disparity between the legal and media definitions of ‘newsworthiness’ that 
needs to be emphasised here: the narrower legal definition refers only to information that is in 
the public interest to report, while the broader media definition essentially involves any 
information deserving to make news for being likely to attract the public’s attention 
(irrespective of whether it serves the public interest or not).9 There also seems to be a 
difference in the way courts approach newsworthiness in the two sides of the Atlantic, with 
the First Amendment definition of newsworthiness in the US allowing a broader 
interpretation of what is in the public interest (compared to England) and, as discussed later, 
largely incorporating its non-legal sense.10  
The key issues that arose at Gawker’s trial were whether the publication of a video excerpt 
revealing salacious details about Hogan’s sexual escapades was newsworthy under Florida 
law, and if so, whether it met a threshold of newsworthiness high enough to override the 
claimant’s right to privacy. Hogan’s case deserves academic attention not only because it is 
one of the few in which claimants surmounted the obstacle of newsworthiness but also 
because it has helped clarify to some extent the vaguely demarcated boundaries between 
newsworthiness and privacy in the digital era.  
Background: the competing claims 
Mr. Hogan sued Gawker Media, its majority-stake owner and founder Nick Denton as well as 
the then editor A.J. Daulerio for publishing private facts after a short clip from a 30-minute 
sex tape - received from an anonymous source - was posted in October 2012 on their gossip 
news website. The footage portrayed Hogan engaging in a sexual encounter with his then best 
friend’s wife, Heather Clem. Hogan initially filed a copyright infringement claim in Florida 
federal court and later sued in Florida state court11 for US$100 million in damages, asserting 
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invasion of his privacy through the unauthorised public disclosure of highly offensive private 
facts. 
Gawker claimed that the US Constitution protected the media’s right to publish legitimate 
news stories, despite their objectionable content. Its defence was that the information 
published was first, truthful, and second, newsworthy given the claimant’s celebrity status 
and previous media reports about the existence of the tape. It was maintained that Hogan’s 
private life and sexual exploits were ‘consistently’12 being made available for public 
consumption as part of his public persona. It was rather unclear, according to the defence, 
which persona the claimant had adopted at the time of the recording: Hulk Hogan, i.e. his 
public persona, or Terry Bollea, i.e. his private one. Gawker’s lawyers pointed out that news 
of the recording had first been published on two websites (‘TMZ’ and ‘The Dirty’) and that 
Hogan had made appearances on television programmes to talk about it.13 They downplayed 
the impact of the video, stating that it revealed nothing about Hogan that he had not 
previously put in the public domain by his own words and actions. 
Hogan’s lawyers refuted the claim that the video was newsworthy and argued that the sole 
reason behind the posting of the clip was a quest for eyeballs ‘after a five-month news “dry 
spell”.’14 They stated that Hogan did not consent to the activity being recorded and 
emphasised throughout the trial the emotional distress of ‘outrageous intensity and 
duration’15 caused to their client by the exposure. Kenneth Turkel, a lawyer for Hogan, 
asserted that Gawker editors had not even had the ‘common decency’16 to follow usual 
journalism procedures and contact Hogan before posting the video in question. Nor did the 
website contact the woman appearing in it or her husband, a radio personality (known as DJ 
Bubba ‘the Love Sponge’ Clem) who reportedly recorded the activity. 
The jury apparently rejected Gawker’s arguments that the video in question contained news 
that were protected by the Constitution. Although it is impossible to know the basis of their 
verdict, it likely that they took the view that the claimant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for conduct of an intimate and sexual nature, despite his celebrity status and previous 
ostentatious invitations into his sexual exploits. Therefore, publishing a sex tape of that 
person without his consent amounted to an interference with his privacy. The claimant’s legal 
team welcomed the case outcome as a victory for anyone who has been ‘victimised by tabloid 
journalism’17 and stated that the jury’s verdict represented ‘the public’s disgust’18 with the 
invasion of privacy ‘disguised as journalism.’19 
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Celebrities, newsworthiness and the public interest 
The tort of public disclosure of private facts is ‘a civil cause of action redressing the 
widespread dissemination of truthful, but shameful, personal information.’20 Under the law in 
Florida, the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 652D (1977) provides: ‘one who gives 
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicised is of a kind that (a) would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.’ The US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Sidis v FR Publishing Corp (1940) 21 that the 
private-facts civil wrong consists in revelations of information that is ‘so intimate’ and ‘so 
unwarranted’ as to ‘outrage the community’s notions of decency.’ Some additional guidance 
on the nature of personal matters that could give rise to potential liability if subjected to 
public view is provided by the Florida Bar. These include a person’s sexual relationships; the 
contents of intimate and personal letters or income tax returns; family quarrels; humiliating 
illnesses; photographs taken in private places or stolen from a person’s home.22 
Offensiveness is a matter for the jury to consider and as a result the answer to the question of 
what amounts to a highly offensive revelation of private facts can vary between communities.  
Successful private-facts claimants sue for the ‘shame, humiliation and mental anguish’23 
which the unauthorised publication of intensely personal information has caused them. Truth 
cannot defeat a private-facts claim and therefore Gawker’s argument that Bollea and Clem 
actually engaged in sexual intercourse as the video demonstrated is immaterial. Truthful 
accounts can still form the basis of a legal action if they concern highly offensive details 
which are not of legitimate public concern. However, the highly offensive treatment of the 
claimant will not mean that the news media is liable, if it can be shown that the material is of 
legitimate public concern.24 The mere fact that a matter has been published does not 
necessarily indicate a legitimate concern on the public’s part. An article may lack 
newsworthiness in the legal sense of the term despite its publication. The notions of 
‘newsworthiness’ and ‘matters of public concern’ are not limited to elective or legislative 
politics.25 Rather they refer to a wide range of material encompassing ‘expression about 
philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters.’26 Matters of public 
importance which are unlikely to be considered private and may be freely published include, 
according to the Florida Bar, a person’s date of birth; the fact that a person is married; 
divorces; military record; admission to the practice of any trade or profession; occupational 
licences; pleadings filed in a lawsuit; official actions; arrest reports; police raids; homicide 
victims; suicides; accidents; fires; or natural disasters.27 In cases concerning mass media 
disclosure of private information which has been lawfully acquired (e.g. it forms part of a 
public record), matters of public importance cover all truthful information with the exception 
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of that which would interfere with a ‘state interest of the highest order.’28 Whether the 
protection of individual privacy furthers an interest of the highest order is yet to be 
determined. 
The elusive element of newsworthiness has been interpreted by the American courts to 
include ‘the macabre, the hair-raising and the tasteless.’29 Rather bizarrely, judges have found 
newsworthiness in revelations about frailties, peccadilloes or eccentricities in someone’s 
character, as for example in Virgil v Sports Illustrated Inc (1976),30 where disclosures of 
‘generally unflattering and perhaps embarrassing’ habits of a famous surfer were justified as 
part of a ‘legitimate journalistic attempt’ to explain his style of body surfing. It may be 
suggested that such a standard does little to dispel the uneasiness and misunderstandings 
between matters of public concern and morbid or sensational matters which simply satisfy 
public curiosity. The requirement for establishing facts that are not of a legitimate public 
concern places on claimants a burden which is virtually insurmountable, thereby practically 
swallowing the public disclosure tort.  
The determination of the issue of newsworthiness has been criticised as being ‘a chicken-and-
egg analysis that often results in courts deferring to the market-driven judgment of 
publishers,’31 presumably to encourage uninhibited and wide open debate on public issues. In 
Gilbert v Medical Economics Co (1981), the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
that liability for disclosure of private facts is limited to ‘extreme’ cases, ‘thereby providing 
the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise effective editorial judgment.’32 
The US Supreme Court has not thus far taken the opportunity to clarify under what 
circumstances privacy rights fade in the interests of newsworthiness. This is not, however, to 
suggest that there are no limits on truthful speech. Whether a matter is one of legitimate 
public concern, which is an evaluation that brings federal constitutional free speech 
consideration within the province of state tort law,33 ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis, 
considering the nature of the information and the public’s legitimate interest in its 
disclosure.’34  
In deciding newsworthiness, US courts may ask whether the information in question can be 
fairly considered as being ‘a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public.’35 US courts generally see social value in topics related to public officials’ activities, 
crimes, accidents, fires, police activity and entertainment events. The public interest hurdle 
was easily overcome in Cinel v Connick (1994),36 where the US Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found that the broadcast of sensational home-made child sexual abuse images 
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belonging to a Roman Catholic priest did not amount to an invasion of his privacy because it 
was a matter of public concern and thus newsworthy. The extent to which a publication 
interferes with the subject’s private life and the weight attached to the privacy interest 
breached by the media could also affect a court’s opinion on the issue of newsworthiness. In 
Virgil v Time Inc (1975), the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the line 
between legitimate public interest and invasion of privacy is to be drawn:  
[…] when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is 
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, 
with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he 
had no concern.37 
The fact that an individual voluntarily subjected themselves to the public spotlight can 
influence the courts’ evaluation of the newsworthiness of a publication. The US Supreme 
Court has held in Bartnicki v Copper (2001) that one of the costs accompanying engagement 
in public affairs is ‘an attendant loss of privacy.’38 Whilst the courts are more likely to find 
that information about public officials is newsworthy, the involvement of a celebrity does not 
necessarily mean that the media are entitled to disclose every detail about the celebrity’s life. 
In Bret Michaels v IEG Inc (1998),39 the US District Court for the Central District of 
California found that the unauthorised disclosure of the infamous sex tape depicting actress 
Pamela Anderson and rock star Bret Michaels by an Internet video distributor was not 
newsworthy. Simply because Anderson had previously appeared nude in magazines and 
publicly distributed video-tapes did not make her real sex life a public matter. Likewise, 
Michaels had an interest in preventing his sex life from being exposed, notwithstanding the 
fact that he was a celebrity too. The Court explained that ‘even people who voluntarily enter 
the public sphere retain a privacy interest in the most intimate details of their lives.’ In a 
similar vein, it is likely that the jury in the Hogan case disagreed with Gawker’s claims that 
Hogan had voluntarily relinquished his privacy expectation by boasting publicly about his 
conquests and sexual accomplishments. What is more, Hogan had not presented a false media 
image that needed correcting. Had he publicly projected himself as a monogamous person, 
then his hypocrisy might have been newsworthy.  
What would the outcome be in England?  
The general defence of newsworthiness, ‘the touchstone of US law,’40 does not apply in 
English law.41 A key element of the English and European courts’ analysis is, as will be seen, 
whether the story contributes to a debate of general interest, ‘an analogous but by no means 
identical concept to the American idea of “matters of public concern”.’42 Hughes and 
Richards explain that ‘public concern’ or ‘public interest’ in the US can mean ‘little more 
than a factual inquiry in practice, which sometimes boils down to whether the public is 
interested in a story.’43 By contrast, the authors point out, ‘numerous English cases under the 
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Human Rights Act have protected privacy interests against press disclosure even when the 
facts alleged constituted front-page news.’44 Public interest in England requires ‘a more 
normative enquiry by the court.’45 English judges use ‘a balancing methodology’46 which 
practically gives strong protection to even famous people’s sex lives and photographs. 
A tort of violation of privacy is not expressly recognised in English law.47 However, as a 
result of a series of cases brought since 2001, it can be safely asserted that the English law 
protects to some extent an individual from unjustifiable intrusions into their private sphere 
through the tort of ‘misuse of private information.’48 This protection is partly based on the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the rights enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law. Privacy interests are 
recognised and protected by Article 8 of the Convention which guarantees a person’s private 
and family life. The right, however, is not absolute. Where Article 8 clashes with Article 10, 
which protects freedom of expression, the competing Convention rights must be balanced. 
Likewise, Article 10 is a qualified right and as such it can be limited for the purposes of 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence and protecting the rights of 
others. 
Claimants seeking damages in cases involving misuse of private information are required to 
establish that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. If the court 
concludes that there was no such expectation, the claimant’s case will collapse. If, however, 
this hurdle is overcome, the court must go on to consider whether it would be appropriate for 
the claimant’s privacy interests to be overridden by the defendant’s - usually the media’s or 
the publisher’s – right to freedom of expression under Article 10. It was established in Ash & 
Anor v McKennitt & Ors (2006) that neither Article has automatic priority over the other.49 
Whenever the values underlying the respective Articles conflict with each other, an ‘intense 
focus is necessary upon the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed.’50 
When determining whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the English 
courts take account of various factors which are weighted up against each other. In Murray v 
Big Pictures Ltd (2008), the Court of Appeal stated:  
[…] as we see it, it all depends upon the circumstances […] of the case. They include the 
attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, 
the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence 
of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and 
the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the information came into the 
hands of the publisher.51 
Privacy cases require therefore a very fact-specific inquiry. Likewise, when determining 
whether speech is a matter of public concern, the American courts require the examination of 
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the ‘content, form and context’ of the speech ‘as revealed by the whole record’52 and the 
weighing of competing values on a case-by-case basis.53 
When is there a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
In determining the ambit of an individual’s private life, Lord Nichols stated in Campbell v 
MGN Ltd (2004) that ‘the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed acts 
the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.’54 Under English law, Mr 
Hogan would have little difficulty in persuading the court that the video disclosed fell within 
the category of private information. The English courts have made it clear that revelations 
about sexual activity are likely to give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy so long as 
the activity involves consenting adults. In Jagger v Darling (2005),55 the elder daughter of 
Mick Jagger successfully applied to the High Court for an injunction in order to restrain 
further publication of a CCTV footage which depicted her ‘engaging in sexual activity’56 
with her boyfriend in an area ‘just inside the closed door’57 of a Soho nightclub. The 
defendant, who was at the time the manager of the club, took possession of the CCTV disk 
and passed it to the News of the World newspaper (NOTW). This was a situation where there 
was clearly a reasonable expectation of privacy, according to the court. The claimant may be 
said to have been guilty of misconduct in the most general sense, having realised that her 
conduct would be observed clearly or electronically recorded, but nevertheless Bell J found 
‘no legitimate public interest in further dissemination of the images which could serve only to 
humiliate the claimant for the prurient interest of others.’58 In CTB v News Group 
Newspapers (NGN)59 (2011), where the claimant footballer Ryan Giggs sought to continue an 
interim injunction restraining the defendant newspaper from revealing details of his sexual 
relationship with a Big Brother contestant, Eady J stated that there was ‘no doubt’60 that 
‘conduct of an intimate and sexual nature’61 gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The limited proposition established in the Hogan case - namely making publicly available a 
tape of a person having sex without that person’s consent constitutes a breach of their privacy 
- is in line with Mosley v NGN (2008).62 In this case, the claimant, the former President of the 
governing body of motor sport (Federation Internationale de l’Automobile), was secretly 
filmed whilst engaging in a sado-masochistic activity with prostitutes in a private flat. An 
edited version of the recording was published on the NGN website in connection with a 
NOTW article claiming that the participants’ ‘sick orgy’ had a ‘Nazi and concentration camp 
theme.’ Eady J held that the claimant had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to 
sexual activities, albeit uncommon, that took place on private property between genuinely 
consenting adults - paid or unpaid.63 He stated that public figures were entitled to a personal 
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life and that people’s sex lives were ‘essentially their own business.’64 The video taken of Mr. 
Hogan was not of an anodyne nature. It involved sexual activities between genuinely 
consenting adult participants which took place in an intensely private setting. There was no 
question of exploiting a vulnerable individual either. It seems therefore likely that there 
would be a reasonable expectation of privacy in these circumstances. 
Gawker also claimed that Mr Hogan talked about the recording in television appearances he 
had previously made. This may suggest that the story was partially already in the public 
domain. In this case, however, this claim would be insufficient to tip the balance in favour of 
freedom of expression. The form of information through which the facts were disclosed (a 
moving image) was more vivid than written words and far more powerful in corroborating 
spoken words describing certain conduct.65 Images, particularly if they have been taken 
without the subject’s consent, are qualitatively different in their intrusiveness compared to 
words alone because they add to the impact of what words convey and so they are likely to 
give rise to an expectation of privacy. Moreover, the fact that news about the recording had 
been revealed to a number of people would not mean there could be no further intrusion on 
Mr Hogan’s privacy by fresh revelations to different groups (in this case via a website).66 In 
addition, the difference in intrusiveness between previous disclosures on the Internet and the 
‘media storm’ that would be generated from publication in domestic newspapers, together 
with unrestricted coverage in their respective websites, would exacerbate Hogan’s distress 
and this would be highly relevant in English law.67 Finally, the context in which the images 
were taken is important in English law. As Baroness Hale stated in Campbell, no expectation 
of privacy is created in relation to images of someone, famous or not, doing ordinary things 
in a public space, or as she famously put it ‘popping out to the shops for a bottle of milk.’68 
The issue of whether Hogan’s sex video fell in the same category would not arise here by any 
stretch of the imagination.   
Striking a balance 
Where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy, the English courts must go on to ask 
whether there would be public interest in the revelation, to the extent that it is not already in 
the public domain, and whether publication would be considered to make a real contribution 
to ‘a debate of general interest’ – in the sense recognised by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Von Hannover (2004),69 discussed below - which might outweigh the claimant’s 
privacy rights. 
Gawker would be expected to argue that the information disclosed by Hogan’s sex tape was 
in the public interest due to the claimant’s status as a public figure. However, although public 
figures ‘must expect and accept’ that their conduct will be ‘more closely scrutinised’ by the 
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media,70 it does not follow that public figure are not entitled to have their privacy respected in 
the appropriate circumstances. As Lord Philips MR observed in Campbell, ‘the fact that an 
individual has achieved prominence on the public stage does not mean that his private life 
can be laid bare by the media.’71 In his testimony to the Leveson Inquiry into the NOTW 
phone-hacking scandal, actor Hugh Grant made a similar point, arguing that it is common for 
people working in show business and journalists to strike mutually beneficial bargains where 
the first get the opportunity to promote their forthcoming projects through their interviews 
and the second to boost their sales. However, such a bargain, he clarified, does not provide 
unlimited access to the individual’s private life:  
Like any barter, when it’s over, it’s over. If I sell you a pint of milk for 50p, I would not 
expect you to come to me forever afterwards, saying, ‘You slut, you sold me milk once. I 
can now help myself to your milk forever.’ I would think you were mad.72 
Moreover, in the seminal case of Von Hannover, the Strasbourg court held that everyone, 
including celebrities, had a legitimate expectation that their private lives would be protected 
and that the general public did not have a legitimate interest in knowing where Princess 
Caroline of Monaco was and how she behaved generally in her private life, even when she 
appeared in places which could not always be described as secluded.73 A justifiable 
interference with a legitimate expectation of privacy should meet a standard beyond mere 
entertainment and vapid tittle-tattle. This could, for example, include contributing to the 
prevention of crime or the detection and exposure of serious impropriety, unethical conduct 
or non-compliance with a duty. The interference could similarly aim to protect the public 
from being misled by an organisation’s actions or an individual’s statements.  
In more recent decisions, like Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) (2012) and Axel Springer AG 
v Germany (2012),74 the Strasbourg court indicated that, depending on the circumstances of 
the case, the definition of what constitutes a debate of general interest may not be limited to 
political issues or crimes but may also extend to publications of private information 
concerning ‘sporting issues or performing artists.’75 In Von Hannover (No 2), the Strasbourg 
Court held that the magazine Frau im Spiegel was entitled to publish a photograph of the Von 
Hannover couple (Princess Caroline and her husband Prince Ernst August) at a ski resort 
when it was published in connection to an article concerning the deteriorating health of the 
Princess’ father, the reigning Prince of Monaco, and the way in which his children 
‘reconciled their obligations of family solidarity with the legitimate needs of their private 
life,’76 including their desire to go on holiday. It seems therefore that the Strasbourg court 
allowed a bit more latitude for entertainment reporting without radically departing from the 
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‘debate of general interest’ requirement for reporting on private issues.77 It also emphasised 
that: 
Although in certain special circumstances the public’s right to be informed can even 
extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, particularly where politicians are 
concerned, this will not be the case – despite the person concerned being well known to 
the public – where the published photos and accompanying commentaries relate 
exclusively to details of the person’s private life and have the sole aim of satisfying 
public curiosity in that respect.78 
The conduct of the person concerned prior to the publication of the report in question is also a 
relevant factor which can influence the balance between a celebrity’s privacy right and 
freedom of expression. Individuals who courted public attention may have their right to 
privacy severely curtailed.79 Hogan’s previous revelations of details of his private life in the 
media could mean that he actively sought the limelight and therefore his legitimate 
expectation that his private life would be protected was reduced. However, the mere fact that 
an individual had previously cooperated with the press cannot serve as an argument for 
removing all protection against publication of the video in question.80 
It can be strongly argued that in Mr Hogan’s case it is unlikely that the public interest would 
be genuinely engaged. The publication of the video appealed to celebrity voyeurism and its 
purpose appeared to be titillation, rather than to contribute to a debate of general interest. In 
Mosley, it was held that although the public was interested in the video demonstrating the 
alleged depravity, as indicated by the 600% increase in the NOTW website since the release 
of the Max Mosley video, it did not automatically follow that the publication of the video was 
in the public interest.81 This approach was more recently endorsed by the UK Supreme Court 
in the high-profile case of PJS v NGN Ltd (2016), which concerned the successful injunction 
of a well-known entertainment figure preventing the publication of the fact that he had a 
three-way sexual encounter with a couple: 
There is not, without more, any public interest in a legal sense in the disclosure or 
publication of purely private sexual encounters, even though they involve adultery or 
more than one person at the same time, (ii) any such disclosure or publication will on the 
face of it constitute the tort of invasion of privacy, (iii) repetition of such a disclosure or 
publication on further occasions is capable of constituting a further tort of invasion of 
privacy, even in relation to persons to whom disclosure or publication was previously 
made - especially if it occurs in a different medium.82 
A majority of the Supreme Court expressed serious doubts as to whether the mere reporting 
of someone’s sexual encounters, regardless of how prominent that person may be, with a 
view to criticising them fell within the concept of freedom of expression under Article 10 of 
the ECHR at all and respected the responsibilities that the Convention tells us come with that 
right.83 It may therefore be concluded that the Article 8 side of the scales would outweigh the 
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Article 10 side in Mr Hogan’s case and the he would have probably succeeded in bringing a 
privacy claim under English law in relation to the video. However, as will be discussed in the 
following section, the damages would most likely be significantly lower than those awarded 
by the American court. 
The award of damages 
At the end of the two-week trial, Gawker Media had US$115 million dollars (£80m) in 
compensatory damages awarded against them for the alleged emotional distress and 
economic injuries Hogan suffered as a result of the publication of the excerpt of the 
videotaped consensual sexual encounter.84 A ‘final devastating blow’85 of US$25 (£17.3m) 
million was awarded against the defendants in the form of punitive damages, of which US$10 
million dollars (£6.9m) had to be paid by the founder of the website, Nick Denton. The 
amount of US$100,000 dollars ͼ£69,500ͽ in damages was also awarded against Daulerio, 
who made the decision to publish the excerpt and wrote the post that accompanied it.86  
In civil cases, the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the claimant, but to 
punish the defendant for particularly reprehensible conduct and deter them (and others) from 
such conduct in the future. Kenneth Turkel, for the claimant, relied on the jurors’ ‘ability to 
send a message’87 to unscrupulous news organisations that media’s protection to report on 
public figures does not cover sex tapes. He asked them to exercise their power to reprimand 
the defendant by adding punitive damages both as a form of punishment to the gossip 
website, which acted with reckless disregard of the claimants’ rights when it posted the 
video, and as a deterrent to other media companies which tend to act in a similar manner. 
Michael Sullivan, for Gawker, said that the award of US$115 million dollars was 
‘punishment enough.’88 It was, according to him, ‘already far beyond their means’ and could 
be ‘debilitating’ for Gawker.89 Gawker’s founder, Nick Denton, commented that the decision 
of the Florida civil jury was ‘extraordinary’ and went, according to him, ‘wildly off the 
rails.’90 He announced that he would appeal against the outcome. In May 2016, a judge of the 
Sixth Judicial Circuit Court in Florida rejected Gawker's application for a new trial in the 
Hogan case and refused to reduce the jury’s damages award of $140m.91 
In England & Wales, the level of compensatory awards in privacy cases tends to be relatively 
low. Indeed, damages for misuse of private information have often been assessed at single 
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figure thousands.92 In the leading case of Campbell v MGN (2002),93 the Court of Appeal 
upheld a compensatory award for £2,500 for the super-model Naomi Campbell following the 
publication of photographs and details of her Narcotics Anonymous visits. An award of 
£1,000 as aggravated damages was also made for the appellants’ conduct in ‘trashing her as a 
person’ in a highly offensive manner for taking her case to court. In McKennitt & Ors v Ash 
& Purple Inc. Press Ltd (2005),94 where passages of the defendant’s book, entitled ‘Travels 
with Loreena McKennitt: My Life as a Friend,’ were held to have presented a revealing and 
intrusive portrait of the Canadian folk singer Loreena McKennitt, Eady J ruled that the 
claimant was entitled to claim damages for hurt feelings and distress, and awarded the 
relatively modest amount of £5,000. English singer Paul Weller’s children were awarded in 
2014 a total of £10,000 in damages for misuse of private information.95 The claim arose in 
relation to the publication of unpixelated photographs of the children’s faces, illustrating an 
article which, according to the High Court, did not contribute to a relevant debate of public 
interest. The defendants unsuccessfully appealed against the High Court’s finding of liability 
and were later refused permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. These sums represent 
rather modest levels of compensatory awards in comparison to awards in other fields of civil 
law, like defamation.96 With these figures in mind, the award of damages in Hogan’s case 
stand out as particularly heavy.  
The largest award of compensatory damages in a privacy claim in England was given in 
Mosley.97 The NOTW was required to pay Max Mosley damages of £60,000 (along with a 
proportion of the claimant’s legal costs), representing the ‘unprecedented’ scale of distress, 
hurt feelings and indignity suffered by the claimant. The amount awarded was thought 
sufficient by the court to serve both a compensatory and a punitive function. It is, however, 
doubtful, whether exemplary or punitive damages are recoverable at common law in the 
context of a misuse of private information claim. Eady J concluded in Mosley that there was 
no authority in favour of extending the application of punitive damages into this newly 
developed field or including an additional element specifically directed towards deterrence.98 
Extending the scope of this relief would also fail to satisfy the tests of necessity and 
proportionality required to justify a free speech limitation.99  
Awards of exemplary damages blur the distinction between criminal and civil litigation, 
where damages are typically compensatory in nature, i.e. they aim at righting a wrong by 
putting the parties to a position which is as close as possible to where they would have been, 
had the harm never occurred. The risk of an exemplary element to damages can discourage 
publishers, especially local or regional newspapers, from engaging in controversial subjects 
and can thwart investigative journalism. However, the levels of damages awarded thus far are 
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arguably ‘too low to act as a real deterrent.’100 In common with the Joint Committee on 
Privacy and Injunctions, the Leveson Report recommended that damages generally available 
in privacy cases should be reviewed and that exemplary damages should be available in 
actions for misuse of private information and similar media torts.101 
Moreover, in Spelman v Express Newspapers (2012),102 where a rugby sportsman at the 
beginning of a promising career failed to secure an injunction against the disclosure of his use 
of banned performance-enhancing drugs, Tugendhat J suggested that damages awarded in 
earlier privacy cases were ‘very low’103 and it should no longer be assumed that awards at 
these levels limit courts’ powers. He also referred to the generous sums paid to settle claims 
in the much publicised phone-hacking cases.104 In future, however, as pointed out in PJS v 
NGN Ltd (2016),105 a new statutory system of exemplary damages may apply against a 
publisher who is not a member of a regulator approved by the Press Recognition Panel 
(established in the wake of the Leveson Inquiry). Under ss 34-6 of the Crime & Courts Act 
2013, a court is given wide discretion to award exemplary damages if it is of the opinion that 
the defendant’s conduct has shown a deliberate or reckless disregard of an ‘outrageous’ 
nature for the claimant’s rights, the conduct is such that the court should punish the defendant 
for it, and other remedies would not be adequate to punish that conduct.106 The Panel has not 
yet approved any press regulator, which would allow ss 34-6 to take effect. It remains to be 
seen in the post-Leveson era what level of awards will be made, how often, and under what 
circumstances, these provisions will be used by the courts. Interestingly, in his dissenting 
opinion in PJS, Lord Toulson stated that he did not regard Eady J’s decision in Mosley as the 
‘final word on the subject.’107 Although he acknowledged the requirement of proportionality, 
he stated that he ‘would not rule out the possibility of the courts considering [exemplary 
awards] to be necessary and proportionate in order to deter flagrant breaches of privacy and 
provide adequate protection for the person concerned.’108 
Based on the study of Hogan’s case, it may be suggested that, despite the relative similarities 
in approach between the two jurisdictions,109 the quanta of financial remedies which 
acknowledge the intrusion and compensate the embarrassment and distress suffered by a 
claimant, differ considerably. It should not be neglected however that in Hogan’s case it was 
the jury, rather than the judge, who determined the amount of the appropriate penalty. The 
high award could be interpreted as a sign of how seriously the jurors regarded this sort of 
privacy violation.  
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In England, the decision on the question of whether exemplary damages are to be awarded 
under s 34 of the Crime & Courts Act 2013 Act or the amount of such damages ‘must not be 
left to a jury.’ This strongly worded statement in s 34(8) of the 2013 Act creates a mechanism 
of constraint against jurors’ potential prejudice, bias or sympathy towards one party and a 
statutory guard against disproportionately large sums. Although, in practice, this prohibition 
on juries awarding exemplary damages only exceptionally applies to defamation cases,110 it 
arguably demonstrates a complete lack of confidence in jurors’ sense of fairness and ability 
to assess the appropriate level of award in a particular case.111 In doing so, the Act deprives 
the courts and the general public from a helpful conceptual tool for measuring the level of 
public toleration for interferences with individual’s rights by contemporary media and 
determining perhaps when the boundaries of toleration have been reached.  
Concluding thoughts on the impact of the verdict in Hogan 
The outcome in Hogan’s trial shows that the disclosure of his sex video by Gawker was 
deemed a ‘compelling privacy [injury] […] capable of withstanding the power of the First 
Amendment.’112 A final aspect of this case to be explored briefly concerns its potential effect 
on reshaping the media’s practice in relation to covering celebrities. It is not unlikely that the 
size of the award of damages will be reduced on appeal, as appellate courts tend to attach 
more weight to First Amendment protections than trial courts do. However, there is little 
doubt that the astounding sum resulted from jurors’ strong condemnation of Gawker’s 
conduct. As Callan put it, the level of the award in this case is: 
[…] a warning shot fired across the bow of a rapacious tabloid press. Jurors and ordinary 
American citizens are fed up with out-of-control media that seem to believe that once the 
title of ‘newsworthy’ is arbitrarily attached to an event or a person, the First Amendment 
will protect the publication of even the most salacious and offensive material that can be 
dredged up by sifting through celebrity mud.113 
The verdict could be seen as reflecting a shift in the public’s tolerance for media interferences 
with individuals’ privacy and implicitly communicates a message about the latitude afforded 
to publishers by readers and the members of the community more generally. What Gawker 
saw as ‘an indiscretion that would have been quickly forgotten,’114 was condemned by the 
jurors as a major intrusion into an individual’s private life. This is also indicated by the fact 
that the damages awarded were US$40 million larger than what the claimant himself had 
originally asked for in relief. The outcome suggests that Gawker’s editorial standards, and 
those of other media organisations focusing on celebrity scandals, are probably out of touch 
with how the public perceives privacy zones and what constitutes a substantive matter of 
public concern. Likewise, recent research in England has conclusively shown that large 
majorities of the public think that public figures’ private lives should remain so and are 
clearly distinguished in their minds from matters that contribute to a debate of general 
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interest and thus merit publication.115 The verdict in Hogan may function as a powerful note 
of caution for online publishers and traditional news outlets reminding them that, when they 
consider publishing details of an intimate and sexual nature, they ought to refrain from 
abusing their power and act responsibly.  
It is questionable whether the outcome itself has the potential to cripple press freedom in the 
US. The case has no precedential force, so justices could rule differently on a similar issue in 
a future case. It may be suggested that it simply demonstrates one court’s view on what is 
considered newsworthy in 2016. The composition of the jury, and arguably their 
preconceived opinions of the former professional wrestler and/or the gossip website Gawker, 
may have also shaped the outcome to some extent. Jurors in different jurisdictions might have 
taken a different view on the newsworthiness of the tape, on who is considered a public 
figure and the extent to which news gatherers can intrude into celebrities’ private lives. 
Nevertheless, the amount of $140 million proved to be ‘the equivalent of a financial death 
penalty’116 for Gawker Media. The organisation filed for bankruptcy and put itself up for sale 
in the summer of 2016.117 It remains to be seen whether the staggering award in this case will 
operate in the US as a strong disincentive against taking the threat of privacy actions lightly 
in the future.  
Finally, had Hogan’s case been brought under the post-HRA 1998 misuse of private 
information tort in England, the outcome would not have necessarily been failure. Details of 
public figures’ private lives have become ‘a highly lucrative commodity for certain sectors of 
the media,’118 especially because they help stimulate sales. Although the publication of such 
news, primarily aimed at entertaining their audience, enjoys the protection of Article 10 of 
the Convention, such protection may yield to the requirements of Article 8 where the 
information at stake is intensely of personal nature and no countervailing interest is served by 
its dissemination. However, Mr Hogan would have in all probability obtained far lower 
compensation in English courts. This factual scenario would have made for an interesting 
case had it been brought before a jury in England, especially following the NOTW phone-
hacking scandal. In the aftermath of the Leveson inquiry, strong evidence has emerged that 
the balance of public opinion, which has consistently favoured protection of freedom of 
expression, has now shifted strongly in favour of individuals’ privacy.119 The influence of 
this shift on journalists’ professional standards and the decision-making process determining 
everyday news content will become clearer in the years to come. 
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